Free Colored West Indians:
A Racial Dilemma

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Slavery was scarcely a racial issue in the eighteenth-century West Indies; it was a racial fact. Seventeenth-century European entrepreneurs established tropical plantations in the Caribbean with African slave labor; their successors universally presumed all slaves to be black and all whites to be free. West Indian whites never seriously questioned the virtues of slavery as an institution until Europe forced emancipation on them in the nineteenth century.

West Indian contrasts with the North American colonies are striking. During the eighteenth century, more and more Americans considered slavery morally repugnant and socially dangerous. By the time of the American Revolution, most of the northern colonies had abolished slavery, and many southerners, themselves reluctant slaveholders, sought to limit its scope and to abolish the slave trade so as to promote eventual emancipation. Most Americans viewed the "peculiar institution" as a source of unmitigated evil. But in the West Indies, slavery was not a peculiar institution, it was a universal one. There were ten slaves to every non-slave, and few free men of any complexion regarded Negro slavery as immoral or unjust.

Notwithstanding the ubiquitous character of West Indian Negro slavery, two kinds of people constituted categories outside the system: whites who were not free, and non-whites who were free. Emigration soon eliminated the first: a hundred thousand white indentured servants, made redundant by African slavery on the sugar estates, streamed out of the Caribbean to the Atlantic sea-
board of North America and elsewhere. The few thousand poor whites who remained endured general contempt for ways of life little distinguishable from those of slaves; indeed, many called them "white Negroes."

West Indians who were free but not white were a more serious and pervasive anomaly. These were of two kinds. Some were slaves who had fled plantations servitude to the mountainous and wooded hinterlands, whence they sporadically raided towns and estates while avoiding recapture. Two substantial groups of runaways and rebels, the Maroons of Jamaica and the Bush Negro tribes of Surinam and French Guiana, resisted all efforts to subdue them; colonial regimes and European empires had to treat with them as self-governing black enclaves, which have maintained their autonomy up to the present time. Rebel slaves in French St. Domingue went much further: they brought down the plantocracy and expelled the whites. Even in the smaller islands, some runaway slave hideouts survived for generations, a remote but ominous presence of which slaveowners always had to take notice.

Rebel and runaway slaves remained essentially outside the West Indian social order, however, when they did not entirely overwhelm it; they constituted a force to be reckoned with, not one that invited intimate mingling. The opposite was true of the free colored—those set free or born free, often the offspring of planters and slaves. Free colored West Indians were an integral part of the social order, and they accepted its regulations and internalized its values, even the perspectives that denigrated them. The free colored population grew slowly until the middle of the eighteenth century and thereafter became increasingly numerous. By the time of emancipation they outnumbered whites everywhere but Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands.

This essay discusses the conflicts between racial theory and practice engendered by West Indian acceptance of this free colored element, ambiguously positioned between black and white. I shall refer primarily to British, French, and Dutch colonies in and around the Caribbean, where large-scale plantations and African slavery were generally more pervasive and came earlier than in Latin America and mainland North America. But this framework is at once too narrow and too sweeping. The non-Hispanic West Indies, which included most of the islands and Guiana in South America, developed patterns of culture and society that set them off from Latin America. But in contrast with the slave states of North America the condition of the free colored in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Brazil, and the Spanish American mainland in many ways resembled that in the West Indies. At the same time, the free colored situation in each West Indian territory was in some respects unique. Conditions differed from island to island, from town to countryside, from community to community, and from period to period, varying with local economy, demography, topography, society, and the impact of external pressures; even dependencies of the same imperial power displayed quite dissimilar racial patterns and prejudices. This paper focuses not on these territorial differences, however, but on the mutual implications and common consequences of this middle group, neither slave nor free, in West Indian plantation societies.

Not only did West Indians, unlike North Americans, recognize an intermediate free colored category; they elaborated subdivisions in a graded series ranging from almost black to nearly white. French St. Domingue, for example, recognized Sacatra, Griffe, Marabou, Mulâtre, Quarteron, Métif, Mamelouk, Quarteronné, and Sang-mêlé. Moreau de St. Méry devotes sixteen pages of his description of that island to mathematical calculations of the 128 parts of white and black blood produced in seven generations of miscegenation; he notes that a mixed descendant of thirteen consecutive white unions would be only 1/8191th black, an invisibly small fraction of pigmentation.

These theoretical gradations in fact played little part in everyday life and almost none in law; given the small size of the whole mixed population, many of the categories could have had no actual exemplars. The significant point is that West Indian whites engendered and encouraged a mixed racial order that was itself stratified by color. Such a racial hierarchy harmonized with the idea of the Great Chain of Being, approvingly alluded to even by the Jamaican Edward Long, who believed that black and white were separate species whose offspring would fail to reproduce. Be
between the Great Chain of Being and the hybrid infertility of mulattoes Long saw no contradiction whatever, for colored variations constantly arose out of unions involving pure whites or pure blacks.6

The notion of hybrid infertility achieved great popularity not in the West Indies, indeed, but in the United States, where belief in polygenesis reinforced hopes that miscegenation would prove to be a biological failure. Such views were attractive to a majority white society that had little place for free people of color and regarded their very existence as an enormity.7 In the West Indies, by contrast, racial miscegenation was so widespread, so generally recognized, and so socially permissible that such matters as polygenes- is and mulatto sterility were only of academic interest.

Free colored West Indians were distinguishable from slaves not only by freedom but by color, for many of them owed their freedom to white paternity. To be sure, some free persons were black and some slaves were "colored"—indeed, half or more of all persons of mixed ancestry were slaves. But the preponderance of mixed ancestry—mulatto, quadroon, octoroon—among free non- whites, and of unmixed African descent among slaves,6 shaped a tendency to designate free persons as "colored" and slaves as "black."

West Indian whites, unlike Americans, held the free colored superior not only to slaves but also to free blacks. Status and fortune depended on closeness to European features; "the souls of the free colored are elevated," declared a French Antillean white, "in proportion as their skin color lightens."9 A Jamaican proprietor suggested that whites advance the free colored as allies against the growing number of free blacks,10 and a Barbadian Assemblyman sought to extend the legal right to testify to "the enlightened class of the free people of colour" as opposed to "the vulgar class."11 West Indian whites frequently exploited the consequent rivalry between black and brown. In the United States, by contrast, colored men had no social identity separate from that of blacks.

One crucial difference lay in the relative proportions of white and black. Greatly outnumbered by slaves, West Indian whites thought of free colored people as allies against slave insurrection;

French Antillean whites termed the free colored the "safeguard of the colonies," whose strength had staved off Maroon insurrec-tion like that in Jamaica.12 Opposing a bill to prevent colored freedmen from acquiring slaves, land, and houses, a Barbadian white thought it "politic to allow them to possess property; it . . . will keep up that jealousy which seems naturally to exist between the free colored people and the slaves." He warned his fellow legislators that "if we are to reduce the free colored people to a level with the slaves, they must unite with them and will take every occasion of promoting and encouraging a revolt."13

Certain Caribbean slaves were on occasion freed and armed in time of war. Thus in 1763 Martiniquans were so eager for free- colored assistance against a threatened English attack that they evaded strict laws against large-scale manumission by pretending to sell slaves into other islands and having them return as free men.14 By contrast, American whites saw free colored men more as leaders of slave revolt than as buffers against rebellion; free colored employment was bitterly opposed by competing white laborers; and state after state required freedmen to depart or face reenslavement.15 In the West Indies, the scarcity and exorbitant cost of white artisans encouraged free colored men to take up skilled occupations; Edward Long himself urged Jamaica to encourage free colored artisans, who "would oblige the white artificers to work at more moderate rates."16

Most important, white West Indians were essentially Europeans, who took a socially stratified order for granted and viewed the separate identity and special privileges of the free colored as a means of consolidating their own status and power. By contrast, the American egalitarian mystique made free colored people an embarrassment even to whites who detested slavery; there was no room for color gradations in a social order where all free white men were equal.

In the West Indies, interracial sexual liaisons were openly coun-腾anced, especially where white women were few, as was generally the case. Whites customarily had colored mistresses, and white fathers commonly placed their colored daughters as concu- binies; a visitor to Barbados was told that "many colored parents
educated their children for this special purpose.” So few colored girls were exempt from this system that brown men were said to have “no other recourse than black women.” The practice was heavily criticized; visitors and local luminaries both deplored its evil consequences. But they inveighed in vain against a well-nigh universal custom, perpetuated in a moral climate that discouraged European women from taking up residence in the West Indies. When a candidate for Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica was called unsuitable because “he frequently Lyes with Black Women,” his supporters rejoined that “the same could be said of virtually every planter on the Island.” An equivalent system of plaçage spread from French St. Domingue to Creole New Orleans and to Charleston, but elsewhere in the South enduring relationships between white men and colored women were usually clandestine and socially reprobated.

Well-to-do West Indian whites not only recognized their colored offspring, but often had them educated in Europe and left them large inheritances. Some colored families came to rival whites in wealth and style of life. Prominent men of color could sometimes exempt themselves from the usual disabilities. The Jamaican legislature passed hundreds of bills granting well-educated and well-to-do colored individuals the perquisites of whites. And in the French Antilles, highly placed men of color and whites married to colored women bought birth certificates “proving” Carib Indian ancestry so as to disavow African. Passing for white was important for such West Indians, but the mechanism and social significance were unlike the North American. In the United States, a person who sought to pass would move to a remote milieu where his background was unknown. In the West Indies, the small size of the society and the limited number of white families, most with well-known genealogies, made such a procedure impossible. West Indian “passing” was not the achievement of the stranger whose African ancestry no one could know; it was accomplished by the prominent figure who was legally accepted as white despite what everyone surmised of his ancestry.

The lot of most West Indian free colored and free black people was far less agreeably “white,” however. The great majority of them in every territory were reputed to be poor or destitute. They were barred from many types of employment, their residence, travel, dress, and diet were restricted, and they suffered indignities from whites of all classes. White paupers got more money than colored ones. Colored men were always subordinate to whites in the militia and other organizations. Every joint function was hierarchically organized. Religion also reinforced color distinctions. Church bells tolled longer for whites than for colored folk in Jamaica; in Antigua a smaller bell announced a colored demise. More severe sentences were meted out to colored than to white for similar offenses. A lone instance of equality shows rare common sense: in 1785 the Dominica Assembly extended the fine for “those who shall wilfully gallop any horse, mare, or mule in any of the streets” from the colored to all free inhabitants, “as the lives of His Majesty’s Subjects are equally endangered by any Person galloping through the Streets, the committee recommend that the like punishment be extended to Whites.”

Free black and colored people were moreover constantly at the risk of reenslavement. Slave escapes or rebellion led to a general hue and cry in which non-whites had to prove their free status by written certificate. And no document was adequate defense against unscrupulous whites. “They live in constant alarm for their liberty,” observed one former slave, “and even this is but nominal, for they are continually insulted and plundered without the possibility of redress.” Those in bondage might well “prefer even the misery of slavery to such a mockery of freedom.”

Growing free colored numbers and the affluence of some further strained their relations with whites. During and after the French Revolution they were suspected of republican sympathies and harassed by countless onerous rules. In St. Domingue white-colored rivalry became so fierce that the embattled groups ignored portents of the slave revolt that overwhelmed them both. The Haitian debacle fed post-Revolutionary reaction, and free colored people came under stricter surveillance throughout the Caribbean. White-colored conflict in the French Antilles engendered lasting bitterness; even after France abolished legal distinctions, white Creoles excluded people of color from the suffrage through high
property requirements. In the British and Dutch territories, Surinam excepted, barriers between white and colored also remained high; for color distinctions were considered crucial to the stability of the social order and the maintenance of slavery. Up to the eve of emancipation, law as well as custom discriminated against the free colored, and when the legal disabilities of color were terminated, the free colored remained, like the slaves, an inferior social order. The small white minority exercised absolute power over social institutions that everywhere discriminated against non-whites, slave and free.

Like men in all societies, colonial West Indians thought in one set of ways, behaved in another, and sought to ignore or to gloss over the disparities between deeds and beliefs. I have described how the local social structures incorporated, not without stress, growing numbers of free colored persons intermediate in status between white and black.

Conflict between personal and group identity illuminates white attitudes and behavior toward the free colored. As a group, West Indian whites continually sought to prevent or to curtail the freeing of slaves, voiced fears about growing free colored influence, and passed legislation or promulgated orders to keep them from infringing on white prerogatives. Almost without exception these laws became dead letters or were constantly circumvented, because their very authors were individually the lovers and fathers of colored women and children whose welfare they wished to promote. Thus the Codé Noir debarred French Antillean slaveowners from freeing concubines and their offspring; yet such manumissions never ceased. Many territories limited colored inheritance from white fathers, but deeds and gifts commonly broke the intent of the law.25

White devotion to the well-being of colored dependents was woven into the fabric of West Indian life, though critics warned of the consequences. "How many Negresses," complained a St. Domingue colonist, "have . . . appropriated the entire fortune of their masters, brutalized by libertinage and incapable of resisting their power over reduced and feeble souls."26 And in Jamaica Edward Long limned a similar portrait of the African mis-

tress with "all her kindred, and most commonly her very paramours, . . . fastened upon her keeper like so many leeches."27 But the benefits were by no means one-sided. "It is to the affection of their concubines," remarked a white Creole on St. Domingue, "that whites have owed the discovery of several conspiracies."28 Illegitimate colored offspring served as convenient and reliable personnel in many white Creole enterprises. The family ramifications of colored liaisons were often advantageous to the white partner, too. In one instance a white proprietor in Clarendon, Jamaica, summarily killed a slave for stealing coffee, and was brought to trial. But "his mistress was the coroner's natural daughter, and the coroner himself was similarly connected with the custos [governor] of Clarendon. In consequence of this family compact, no inquest was held, no enquiry was made; the whole business was allowed to be slurred over."29

But such familial intimacy betokened no white willingness to accept colored people as equals. A case in point comes from Berbice, British Guiana. The prosperous, well-educated, free colored community, most of them the children or grandchildren of leading whites, petitioned in 1822 against a court decision reserving certain estate positions to whites. The Council reversed the ruling and made free coloreds eligible for certain other positions hitherto "exclusively admitted to whites." But when the Governor proclaimed this decision and appointed a few colored men to the militia, white public opinion was outraged. He was shocked. "I . . . never could have anticipated a future objection on their part," he wrote, "more particularly so when I considered (as the fact is) that every member of the Council has a large family of coloured children himself. . . . Really I thought they would feel these appointments a compliment to themselves and their connections." But what the whites most resented, in fact, was the Governor's reference to colored people as "brethren." Colored people were not whites, and to put them in positions of power and trust would deny "an order of things coeval with European superiority." Their own children perhaps excepted, whites would not accord equality to free colored persons but "little emerged from ignorance above the slave population."30
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West Indian whites saw nothing amiss in relationships of the greatest intimacy which would forever remain asymmetrical in power and status. What could be more agreeable, after all, than to become the father of numerous devoted offspring who could never threaten your own position, never push you out of the way? The white West Indian patriarch’s position was in some respects uniquely enviable.

Nor did white West Indians see anything incompatible in personal behavior that violated decrees they themselves had urged. And they showed a keen awareness of what was circumstantially appropriate as opposed to technically legal. Hence the common form in Jamaican wills, bequeathing property to various free colored mistresses and offspring “according to the manners and customs of this country,” a clear recognition that it was not according to English law.

How was it that whites horrified by free colored pretensions in general could give their own colored offspring every benefit of education and inheritance? What could these children do with their schooling and their money in a society that barred them from the ruling elite? Each white parent making such arrangements must have hoped or believed that his children might escape these constraints. In places like Jamaica, where more than five hundred colored became white by legislative fiat in the last decades of the eighteenth century, this was a real prospect. And money and education might buy them places as whites in England or in France if not in the West Indies. Finally, few West Indians reasoned from the particular to the general. Although they saw most other whites doing as they did, they never drew the conclusion that their own actions helped to enlarge and enrich the free colored group which must, with the diminution of the proportion of pure whites, continually erode claims to racial exclusivity.

The free colored were accepted elements in eighteenth-century West Indian social systems only so long as they could be regarded primarily as individuals allied by family loyalty to whites. Whenever, in the eyes of the whites, they became a group they constituted a threat to the social order. Group identity implied corporate self-regard, pressures, and demands for relaxing and ultimately erasing distinctions of color.

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Free colored persons were only acceptable, therefore, when they were considerably less numerous than the whites, endured without question their subordinate rank in society, and were divided among themselves by distinctions of shade. Until the late eighteenth century or afterward, these conditions characterized most West Indian colonies. Free colored numbers grew slowly during the first half of the century and began to increase more rapidly only after about 1760. In the 1790s they were still less numerous than whites everywhere except Trinidad, Curaçao, and Dominica but were almost three-fourths the number of whites in St. Domingue and Surinam and about half in Jamaica and Martinique.83 As the free colored began to achieve numerical equivalence, whites became increasingly alarmed about their role.

The absolute decline of white populations made more difficult the denial of free colored participation in civil affairs. Jamaica enfranchised the Jews to increase the number of whites competent to take part in government.84 Fear of free colored demands led English whites in Dominica, on the other hand, to refuse extending the suffrage to local French Catholic whites. Were they to acknowledge “that among the white population . . . it is impossible to select a sufficient number of persons properly qualified to sit in the House of Assembly, the Free Coloured (whose clamorous pretensions already menace the Peace of the Colony) would have another pretext for urging their claims.”85 Only the Dutch in Surinam did not hinder free colored advance; many of them held high administrative posts during the half century before the end of slavery in 1863.86

But even where the free colored were most numerous, for a long time they accepted their subordinate position without demur. To complain at all was to risk being regarded as troublemakers, to arouse white wrath, and to jeopardize existing prerogatives. “To such restrictions as have already been laid, we have always submitted, not only without murmuring or repining, but with cheerful rejoicing that it has been our lot to live under so free and happy a constitution,” averred a group of Barbadian freedmen, asking the Assembly not to rescind their privileges. They were “sensible that in a country like this where slavery exists, there must necessarily be a distinction between the white and free coloured inhabi-
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tants, and that there are privileges which the latter do not expect to enjoy.\textsuperscript{36} The Trinidad free colored population remained entirely passive in the face of threatened loss of privileges; "they made no petitions, advanced no claims, claimed no rights."\textsuperscript{37} A memorial signed by 236 of them in 1810 merely sought to ensure against retrogression, disclaiming any new pretensions as "highly unbecoming."\textsuperscript{38} A similar petition from the free colored of Dominica noted that they "have been always foremost to oppose rather than to promote innovations."\textsuperscript{39} And the free colored of St. Domingue were emboldened in 1790 to ask for political representation only as a "Third Estate," inferior to the presumed nobility of the island whites.\textsuperscript{40} Free colored people not only failed to combine to demand privileges or to deplore inequities; they seldom banded together at all. The wealthiest and best positioned of them were either in Europe or leagued with individual whites, precluding any common free colored social organization.

The discrepancy between the sexes was also incompatible with a sense of community: white preemption of almost all the lighter-skinned women left brown men without partners or prospects of establishing durable positions through family connections. The separation of free colored women, as mistresses of whites, from free colored men, who had to seek black partners, suited the whites not only for sexual reasons, but also because it tended to preclude the formation of a durable free colored class remote from both white and black progenitors. Long's theory of mulatto infertility was less a justification of polygenesis than a support for the hope that the free colored would never become a permanent class, which could only develop by procreation within the group. Mixtures of free colored with black slaves, on the one hand, sank insensibly into the black mass; offspring of white and colored, on the other hand, were disarmed by fealty to whites, by the hope of upward mobility, and by color shade prejudice.

Finally, the prospect of upward mobility and the white bias of all segments of the population was inimical to free colored solidarity. The lighter distanced themselves from the darker; those who held properties and slaves drew close to the whites and shunned the free colored townsfolk, artisans, pilots, shopkeepers, and indi-

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gents. The free colored, having internalized the unfavorable white stereotype of their group, tried only to exempt themselves from it as individuals. Thus one Jamaican white in 1782 sought legislative concessions for his illegitimate children on the ground that he intended "to bestow on them such fortunes as to raise them above the common level of people of color." A colored petitioner in 1797 asked special privileges for herself and her sister on the ground that they had "conducted themselves in a more decent and creditable manner than persons of their complexion in general."\textsuperscript{41} In Curaçao and Surinam the free colored of Jewish descent, better off and more "respectable" than the rest, lived apart in separate quarters.\textsuperscript{42}

But there were inconsistencies in all this, and especially in white stereotypes, which ultimately destroyed the existing racial balance and altered the role of the free colored. If the free colored were to remain divided, they needed faith in the prospect of upward mobility for individuals, including recruitment into white society for those who were most European in appearance and ancestry. Many free colored efforts were bent toward just this end. The plight of the free colored majority, visibly mulatto or darker, is seldom recorded; what dominates the records are the pleas of the almost white who would be regarded as white, or the reputed white who forged documentary evidence of racial purity. Since a hierarchy of class as well as of color thoroughly imbued colonial West Indians, it is no surprise to find the free colored leadership of St. Domingue, on the very eve of revolution, bending every effort to gain a measure of political participation for those who were quadroon or lighter, well educated, rich, and of attested good character—a combination of traits that, they themselves agreed, characterized less than one-tenth of the free colored population.\textsuperscript{43} It was to enhance divisiveness that white West Indians urged privileges for those closest to white, and in some cases even their incorporation into white society.

But this ameliorative strategy was doomed because it was unworkable in everyday practice. It became patently unrealistic with the growth of an urban free colored proletariat, including some runaway slaves, who were not intimately linked by family and fa-
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vor with whites and who could not hope to achieve whiteness. Amelioration also flew in the face of another white requirement, racial purity. Many whites feared that a settled policy of racial amalgamation would endanger the whole social structure. The occasional light-skinned individual might pass, manufacturing an accredited Carib Indian ancestor when necessary; but only a few could be accommodated in this fashion if white endogamy were to be preserved—a matter essential not merely for racial purity qua purity, but for the reputed whiteness on which supposed slave respect depended.

Free colored equality with whites would destroy "the ascendancy which the white population holds over the blacks," was a typical expression of this view. "The Dominion which we hold over the Blacks, arises from an acknowledged Superiority of the Whites . . . Destroy this opinion by a degrading association with an inferior class (whom they despise, and are jealous of) and you break down the only barrier between us and insurrection." Hence the local white opposition to a militia commission for a St. Domingue Creole whose white descent had, some years before, been unsuccessfully challenged; the mere fact that his color had ever been called into question corroded respect for the racial hierarchy. Undermine the general faith in elite whiteness, and the slaves would cease to hold their masters in awe.

Slave subordination in West Indian society was felt to require both racial stratification and segregation, but these two principles were mutually incompatible. When the whites lumped all free colored together and closed off avenues for individual advance, they impelled the free colored to unite, to regard themselves as a group, not just as individuals seeking to eschew group identity, and inspired them toward egalitarian, if not revolutionary, credos.

At the same time, familial ties between whites and free colored West Indians were frayed, and as white sex ratios became more balanced and a stricter code of sexual morality came into being, white-colored liaisons were less openly avowed, illegitimate offspring less freely accepted. And free colored demands for equality—demands the more intensely expressed lest emancipation leave them not only racially segregated but reduced in status to the mass of the blacks—were rejected by increasingly beleaguered whites. Tactical reasons, not any diminution of racism, persuaded them to accede to free colored citizenship on the eve of emancipation.

In summary, West Indian whites continually emphasized the need for a free colored group intermediate between themselves and the blacks. The distinction of color at each end of the free colored spectrum was crucial. The racial structure of slave society required the free colored to be colored—neither black nor white. If there were many free blacks, the mass of slaves would come to resent their own servitude; the spectacle of free Negroes was said to be dangerous to slave discipline. But to place the free colored on a par with whites or to let too many infiltrate the white elite would jeopardize slave respect for the absence of African blood among whites. (Although there were many free colored slaveholders, it was a white stereotype that slaves respected only white masters.)

Thus the criterion of color was the essential distinction between whites and free colored, and whites resisted any blurring of the line as inimical to the social order. In this they read the future rightly; for once the free colored gained equal civil (but not social) status, racial distinctions in post-emancipation society no longer rested on a legal foundation. Bereft of the whole racial code, whites erected elaborate social and economic barriers against black and colored people but had to do so on the basis of class, not of color.

Notwithstanding the discontinuance of legal discrimination, the former free colored continued to dominate the non-white hierarchy, and to this day their descendants constitute the bulk of the elite and middle class. Advantages of wealth, education, and status gave them a head start over the former slave population. Lighter skinned than most of the emancipated slaves, they were, moreover, the beneficiaries of white preference and of the internalization of a white bias at all levels of society.

Yet the West Indian colored middle classes today evince little if any sense of corporate identity or group consciousness. Like their free colored forebears, they remain conspicuously individ-
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ULISTIC AND SOCIALLY CONSERVATIVE. THIS RESEMBLANCE IS A JOINT CONSEQUENCE OF STRUC-

NOTES


2. The differences are explored in David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies (London and New York: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1972).


8. The free non-white people of Surinam in 1830, for example, included 3,947 colored and 1,904 black; the slaves numbered 3,033 colored and 45,751 black (Hoetink, op. cit., p. 62).


17. [B. Browne], The Yarn of a Yankee Privateer, quoted in Handler and Sio, op. cit., p. 251.


21. The situation was similar to that in Brazil, where an early nineteenth-century visitor asked a mulatto if the local captão-mór was a mulatto and was told, “He was, but is not any more” (Joao Mauricio Rugendas, Viagem pitoresca através do Brasil, quoted in A. J. R. Russell-Wood, “Brazil,” in Cohen and Greene, op. cit., pp. 84–133, ref. p. 113). See also Franklin W. Knight, “Cuba,” in ibid., p. 290.
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29. Lewis, op. cit., p. 335.


35. Hoetink, op. cit., p. 64.


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40. Debsbach, op. cit., p. 313, n. 5.


42. Hoetink, op. cit., pp. 64, 69.

